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The prevalence of user innovation and free innovation transfers:
Implications for statistical indicators and innovation policy
Introduction and overview
Empirical research by innovation scholars has now clearly documented that many of the innovative products we buy from producers are in fact developed and prototyped and tested and improved by "lead users." These individuals and firms often innovate in order to solve their own, ahead-of-market needs. Later, when a commercially-attractive market emerges for these products, producers adopt or learn from products users have already developed and used in the field as an important feedstock to their own product development and commercialization efforts. This user-centered innovation pattern has been shown to hold both in the case of innovating user firms developing processes and equipment and software for in-house use, and in the case of innovative products developed for individual end users, like novel sports equipment and foods. End user "consumers," it has been found, working individually or in groups, are the actual developers of many consumer products later commercialized and sold to the general marketplace by producers.
We define user-innovators as firms or individual consumers that benefit from using a product or a service they develop. In contrast, producer-innovators are firms or individuals that benefit from selling a product or a service they develop. Lead users are a subset of all users. Their primary distinguishing feature is that they are ahead of important market trends, and so experience new emerging needs ahead of the bulk of the market. As a result, lead users often innovate in order to solve their own, ahead-of-market needs -often before producers are even aware of those new needs .
Statistical indicators used in official surveys of innovation activities have not addressed this new understanding of the central role of users in the innovation process.
New indicators must be created to provide a clearer picture. This is especially important as research shows that user innovation is becoming steadily more important due to steady improvements in Internet communication tools and computer-based design and design collaboration tools.
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In this paper, we report upon a first use of novel statistical indicators in a survey measuring important aspects of user development and diffusion of innovations. This survey was undertaken by Statistics Canada in 2007, and utilized a sample of 1,219
Canadian manufacturing plants. It was required that all survey participants had developed new process equipment innovations for their own use, and/or had modified process equipment to better suit their needs.
Analysis of survey responses showed that, on average, innovating user firms had spent a significant amount of money and time developing process innovations and improvements for in-house use. Analysis also showed that about 25% of these firms knew that innovations they had developed had been adopted by process equipment producers. A similar fraction was aware that innovations they had developed had been adopted by other user firms.
When asked about the terms under which their innovations had been transferred to adopters, a significant fraction reported that they did not receive a fee or other consideration for the transfer of their intellectual property. User-innovators that had transferred their innovations without fee explained that they were motivated to do so because of expected benefits to themselves including: to allow a supplier to build a more suitable final product; to gain feedback and expertise; and, to enhance reputation. These benefits are similar to the types of benefits claimed by contributors to open source software projects -which supports the idea that the pathways to private returns from free revealing are quite general in their basic nature. As we will discuss in section 5, this finding may justify significant changes in government policy related to intellectual property rights.
We have been able to capture the innovation patterns just described because the experimental Statistics Canada survey we report upon, to be described in detail later in the paper, differs in two crucial respects from current official government surveys of the innovation process: (1) innovation development by users is better tracked; and, (2) the transfer of user-developed innovations from users to producers is tracked for the first time in any government survey. As a result, what is actually occurring among innovators and adopters in the field is more accurately captured. We think that it is important to create similar improvements in official government surveys and innovation statistics.
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These improvements will enable policymakers to build their work upon more accurate assessments of real-world innovation processes. In section 5, we will explain the major improvements we think are needed, and explain our reasoning.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review relevant scholarly literature. In section 3 we explain the methods used in the 2007
Statistics Canada follow-up survey on user innovation among Canadian manufacturing firms. In section 4 we present our findings derived from that study. In section 5, we conclude with a discussion of steps policymakers can take to better measure and assess the free revealing of innovation-related information via new statistical indicators.
Section 2: Literature Review
In this paper, we will report upon empirical work that explores the development and transfer of advanced process equipment innovations, carried out by firms that use that equipment. Accordingly, in this section, we first briefly review the empirical literature documenting user innovation. Next, in order to create a platform for a discussion of innovation transfer patterns observed in our survey, we discuss the nature and economics of intellectual property rights, and the economics of "free" innovation transfer. Finally, we discuss the current near-absence of government statistical indicators and surveys related to the increasingly important phenomena of user innovation and the diffusion user-developed innovations.
User Innovation
User innovation has been found to be both important and frequent in both industrial and consumer fields. In both, the most active user-innovators are the "lead users" that populate the leading edge of markets and have a strong need for solutions to the new needs they encounter there. User innovation has been extensively studied and reported upon by many, so this overview will be comparatively brief, and will focus upon what is known about user innovation in process equipment -the subject matter of the pilot study we will report upon later. A thorough review of user innovation of all types can be found in von 2005) .
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Empirical studies have found that, in the great majority of fields studied, process equipment users rather than equipment producers are the actual developers of most functionally and commercially important process equipment innovations. Thus, in a combined sample covering the fields of semiconductor production equipment and printed circuit card processing equipment, 67% of the most important process machine innovations were found to have been developed by machine users (von Hippel, 1977) . In the field of pultrusion processing equipment (a type of plastics processing equipment)
90% of the most important innovations were developed by users (Lionetta 1977 ). Enos (1962 reported that nearly all the most important innovations in oil refining processes were developed by user firms. Freeman (1968) found that the most widely licensed chemical production processes were developed by user firms. Pavitt (1984) found that a considerable fraction of inventions by British firms was for in-house use. VanderWerf (1992) studied samples of important industrial gas-using and plastics forming process equipment innovations. In both samples, users were found to be the most frequent developers of these innovations.
Extant empirical research also documents that many user firms develop and modify process equipment to serve their own, in-house needs. As can be seen in table 1, process innovation studies directed at specific types of process innovation have shown that a significant percentage of users do develop or modify process equipment and software for their own, in-house use.
The broadest of the studies summarized in table 1 was based upon a survey of 26
Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs) that Statistics Canada conducted in 1998 (Sabourin and Beckstead 1999) . The sample for that survey consisted of Canadian manufacturing establishments with at least 10 employees. Among other questions, it collected data on the adoption, modification and development of 26 specific technologies that had been selected as advanced manufacturing technologies (AMTs) at the time of the survey -technologies such as material-cutting with the use of laser energy or water jets rather than traditionally-used physical cutting tools (Arundel and Sonntag, 1999) . A key finding was that 46 percent of the surveyed manufacturers bought AMTs 'off the shelf'
only. Twenty-six percent, however, modified the AMT equipment they purchased, and 28% developed their own specific technologies because there was no market supply. 
Economics of intellectual property rights
The economic reasoning which has led governments to grant innovators intellectual property rights is familiar to many. It begins with the assumption that private individuals and firms will invest in innovation only if they expect to make attractive profits from doing so. If imitators can get free access to information innovators have spent money to develop, it seems reasonable that innovators' profit expectations will drop: after all, innovators will then expect to be competing in the marketplace with imitators that have lower costs because they have been able to "free ride" on innovators'
investments.
Free riding is likely because information is slippery stuff. For example, it has been shown that industrial secrets generally become known to competitors after only a short while. Thus, Mansfield (1985) studied 100 American firms and found that "information concerning development decisions is generally in the hands of rivals within about 12 to 18 months, on the average, and information concerning the detailed nature and operation of a new product or process generally leaks out within about a year." Indeed research shows, perhaps as a consequence of such pervasive and rapid information spillovers, that social rates of return on innovation are higher than private rates of return. This in turn implies that private rates of return should somehow be increased so that society gets "enough"
innovation.
There are many ways to increase innovators' private returns from innovation to compensate for the effects of free riding by imitators. For example, governments can and do offer R&D subsidies and tax credits to lower innovators' private costs. Governments also can and do enhance innovators' private returns by granting those who qualify temporary monopolies on their innovation-related knowledge via intellectual property law. Indeed, in the U.S., the power to grant such monopolies is grounded in the Of course, economists and policymakers understand that encouraging innovators by granting even temporary monopoly rights to specific information, usually creates significant economic costs that society must bear. Innovators' routes to increased profits involve restricting access to and/or charging fees for utilizing their protected information.
This information would otherwise be free and universally available -because information today is reproducible at a marginal cost close to zero. The result is the creation of what is called a "deadweight loss" to the economy: Patent and copyright owners can charge more than they could if access to the information was free. Also, additional applications of the information that would pay only if access were free are not undertaken -and this creates further economic loss. (An offsetting factor by which intellectual property rights may act to reduce deadweight loss is that innovators may disclose more if they are granted temporary monopoly rights to their knowledge -and a temporary secret is better than a permanent one in terms of social welfare. However, as we noted earlier, it is difficult to keep a secret for long in any case, and so the extent of this proposed advantage is not clear.)
Economics of free revealing
When we say that an innovator "freely reveals" proprietary information, we mean that the information is opened to others at no cost, and all parties are given equal access to it-the information becomes a public good (Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel 2003) .
Until the economics of free revealing began to be understood and appreciated, the losses associated with intellectual property rights had seemed a necessary evil to both academics and policymakers, for reasons described earlier. Debates about the intellectual property system, therefore, did not deal much with its fundamental desirability. Instead they were largely restricted to the desirability of various refinements to the system, such as increasing or decreasing patent quality, and decreasing or increasing the length of a copyright grant.
An appreciation of the economics of voluntary free revealing has now changed the terms of this debate -because free revealing also encourages innovation through private rewards, but does this without public grants of temporary legal monopolies to innovators.
The phenomenon of free revealing of innovations has been brewing in the backwaters of economics for quite some time. Routine and intentional spillovers of innovationrelated knowledge developed by profit-seeking firms at private expense was first described by Allen (1983) . More general interest in the phenomenon of free revealing was sparked by the emergence of "open source" software development projects into public prominence in the 1990's. Clearly, it seemed to observers, open source software was a phenomenon of major economic importance. And, in the many open source software projects using the popular General Public License (GPL), it was enforced policy that project contributors would routinely and systematically freely reveal the software code they had developed at private expense to an information commons (Stallman 1998) Research into why innovators would freely reveal their innovations at no charge taught us how the behavior could be economically rational. Innovators could profit from their private innovation investments despite or even because of their voluntary information spillovers. Routes to private profit through free revealing of innovations were found to include increases in innovators' reputations, which in turn increase the profitability of innovating firms (Allen 1983) or the job prospects of individual contributors (Lerner and Tirole 2002 (Raymond 1999) .
Further, adopting manufacturers may be able to produce the innovation and sell it at a price lower than innovating users' in-house production costs -which provides a benefit to those innovating users (Harhoff et al, 2003) .
Finally, individual participants in open and collaborative innovation projects, such as
open source software development projects, say they derive valuable private benefits from the fun and learning they gain from participation (Lakhani and Wolf 2005) .
Any and all of these consequences of free revealing just described can produce significant private returns to the original user-innovator. The net result is a new appreciation of how innovators can actually profit by "giving away" innovations they develop at private expense.
Measuring conditions of innovation transfer
Innovation transfers from user-innovators to producers, and the terms under which these take place, are today not measured by any indicators used in official CIS surveys are addressed to firms. One question offers a list of possible information sources ranging from "clients" to suppliers to government labs, and asks respondents to rate the importance of inputs from each to their development efforts for their innovation projects. Invariably the client (user) is ranked as supplying very important information by most (Eurostat 2004:56) .
This question poses two problems from the point of view of documenting the innovation role of users. First, it does not ask about the actual nature of the information transferred from user to producer. This is a problem, because such information can range from very rich -for example, a CAD file containing the entire, field-tested design for a new product, to information as sparse as "I need an updated machine from you." Second, respondents are not asked about the terms under which this 'very important information' was supplied. If, for example, a user offered information of substantial value to the producer, such as a complete prototyped and field-tested design, was that information licensed to the producer for a royalty? Or, was it provided gratis as in the free transfer pattern described earlier?
A companion study
A study by de Jong and von Hippel (2009) can be regarded as a companion to the empirical research we report upon in this paper. That study also explores innovation and innovation transfer by user-developers of process innovation. It is based upon a sample of 498 "technology-based" firms in the Netherlands with 100 or less employees.
In brief overview, the de Jong von Hippel study found that 47% of respondents reported developing entirely novel process equipment for their own use. The average project cost was €235 000. Thirty six percent of respondents reported modifying their process equipment at an average project cost of €120 000. These are quite significant investments for these relatively small firms. Yet, only 13% of these projects were protected by any form of intellectual property by the user-innovators.
With respect to information transfers from innovators to others, 25% of the user innovations were transferred to process equipment producers that presumably manufactured them for general sale. Forty eight percent of these were simply given away to these producers without compensation, and a further 39% were transferred with only informal offers of possible future compensation by recipient producers, such as possible price reductions on future purchases.
Survey methods
The survey data from which we draw our findings ( 
Extent and cost of process innovation by Canadian user firms
Selection criteria for the 2007 Follow-up to the AT07 Survey insured that all respondents had modified and/or developed new process equipment related to one or more of 26 AMTs they had adopted within the last 3 years. As we see from table 2, a significant fraction of respondents report engaging in these activities on a continuing basis, and most do this through informal programs. We next see from table 3 that the average user project to modify or develop AMTrelated process equipment involves a substantial expenditure of cost and time. The average modification project cost over $600 thousand Canadian, and took in excess of 2 months to execute. The average new technology development project cost almost $1 million Canadian, and took in excess of 6 months to execute. Resources expended on process innovation projects come largely from the innovating firms themselves. As can be seen from table 4, 98% of these projects are funded entirely or partially from internal process user firm funds. Some also involve investments from customers, from suppliers or from "other" funding sources. At the same time, more than half of respondents report cooperating with others to carry out their innovation projects (table 5) . We do not know the source of funds drawn upon by other cooperators during the innovation projects in which they mutually engage. As a final element in this section, we report upon responses to a question on the type of budget used for the user process innovation projects. As can be seen, about one half of the development projects and one third of the maintenance projects are funded as R&D (table 6). 
4.2: Protection of and diffusion of user-developed process innovations
We now turn to a second major category of findings -how user process innovation is protected and/or diffused. From table 6, we can see that only about half of the userinnovator respondents attempt to protect their process innovations from potential imitators in any way. Since fewer modification projects are protected than are new development projects (which, as we saw in table 3, are on average more expensive) it may be that there is some tendency to protect more expensive projects -and/or it may be that intellectual property protection is easier to obtain on the more novel projects.
The responses in table 7 regarding methods of protection employed add up to more than 100% since many respondents use more than one method. The confidentiality agreement, which is relatively cheap, is the protection methodology most utilized by respondents. Such agreements are generally only negotiated with specific firms seeking to inspect specific innovations. This suggests that a lot of the process innovations developed by user-innovator manufacturing firms are in fact of interest to and examined by others outside the firm. In table 8 we see that about 40% of firms know of other firms that have carried out developments similar to theirs -so there is certainly a significant amount of independent parallel invention and/or collaborative development going on among users. There is also evidence for diffusion of the user-developed innovations from the innovators in our sample to imitators. In table 9 , we see that over 25% of the userinnovator firms think that, in at least one instance, a process innovation they developed for in-house use has been adopted by a supplier or other of the type of process technology at issue. Of course, "adoption" by a supplier means commercialization. With commercialization, the user-developed innovation becomes available to the entire marketplace of users. 
Discussion
From prior research, it is known that manufacturing firms frequently develop and improve the processes, equipment and software that they use for production. From the findings of the pilot survey of this type of innovation activity among Canadian manufacturing plants, we were able to show that a significant amount of money and time is expended on this activity -and that these innovations are a significant feedstock of process innovations for equipment producing firms.
The data also enables us to estimate that spending on process innovations by user firms is a significant fraction of all Canadian R&D expenditures in manufacturing. Based on the average expenditures in Table 2 , and the fraction of Canadian manufacturing establishments represented in the survey sample, and the percentage of the expenditure which can be attributed to a R&D budget ( Table 6) Analysis also showed that about 25% of firms that developed or modified their process technologies were aware of innovations that they had developed that had been adopted by process equipment producers. A similar fraction was aware of innovations they had developed that had been adopted by other firms using similar process technologies.
When asked about the terms under which these transfers had been accomplished, a significant fraction reported that the transfers had been made without compensation through a fee or other consideration for the transfer of the intellectual property they had developed. We will discuss the important policy implications of this finding later in this section.
Types of new indicators needed
We have been able to capture user innovation and transfer pattern via the followup survey to AT07, because that survey differs in two crucial respects from current official surveys of the innovation process: (1) innovation development by users is better tracked; (2) the transfer of user-developed innovations from users to producers is tracked for the first time. As a result, what is actually occurring among innovators and adopters in the field is more accurately captured.
The indicators we present in Tables 2 through10 are pilot versions of a set of new statistical indicators which could be used with respect both to monitoring the development of intellectual property, and with respect to monitoring technology transfer.
We think that it is important to create similar improvements in indicators used in official surveys of innovation. Such improvements will enable policymakers to build their work upon more accurate assessments of real-world innovation processes.
In the research presented here, the new indicators were applied as part of a technology use survey. There is also a case for measuring user-developed innovation in the more prevalent innovation surveys. This could easily be done by adding questions, or by doing a follow up survey directed only to respondents reporting such activities. More specific questions about the source of product innovations, already discussed in this paper, could be added to identify the production of products that result from userdeveloped innovation.
The transfer of user innovations to producer firms should be a matter of interest to policymakers because, as mentioned previously, we now understand that users are the actual developers of prototype versions of many of the new products introduced to the marketplace by commercial producers. Until relatively recently, researchers and policymakers did not know that significant transfers of innovation-related information from users to producers existed. Now that this is better understood, official statistical indicators and surveys may be revised to reflect this new understanding.
Example of new innovation process insights
As illustration of the important information that user innovation and innovation transfer surveys can bring to researchers and policymakers, note that the Statistics Canada pilot study has documented two commonly-used mechanisms by which userinnovators obtain private rewards for the transfer of their privately-funded process innovations -one involving cost-free revealing of the innovations and one not. Both mechanisms clearly offer private returns to innovators and thus encourage innovation.
Free revealing has been amply documented in studies of open source software projects.
It is here, and also by de Jong and von Hippel (2009) , shown to be significant among user-developers of process equipment innovations for the first time. We predict that further government surveys of the type piloted here will find similar patterns of free revealing in many other industries.
From the point of view of policymakers, there are two major next questions to ask before the policy implications of this finding can be assessed: (1) are both mechanisms equally effective at inducing innovations? And (2) is one mechanism preferable to the other for some reason such as likely impacts upon social welfare? At this point, we have only initial answers to both questions. But, we will argue that these matters are so important to innovation policymaking that there is a strong case for developing the new statistical indicators needed to develop better answers over time.
First, are free innovation transfers as good as access restrictions and/or for-fee transfers at encouraging innovation by providing access to attractive private profits? On the basis of this first survey with its novel indicators, this seems possible. Consider that it is likely that both fee free and fee-based transfer options are available to many of the user-innovators developing process innovations in our sample. After all, at least trade secrecy protection is always applicable in the case of process innovations that can be used by user-innovators while hidden behind factory walls. And, as we saw in Table 7 , most innovators that protected their innovations did utilize trade secrecy protections -as evidenced by the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements. Yet, despite the availability of this and probably other intellectual property mechanisms to support exclusivity and the ability to charge fees for access, about half of the survey respondents choose to transfer their innovations at no fee at least part of the time. Given economic rationality on the part of respondents, this suggests that, some significant fraction of the time, innovators think that free transfer gives them greater private returns than does utilizing the monopoly rights enabled by the intellectual property rights system.
With respect to the second question, as was mentioned earlier, fee-free transfers of innovation-related information are in principle preferable to transfers involving fees or other restrictions from the standpoint of social welfare. If one charges a price for something that exceeds the marginal cost of production, one is creating a "deadweight loss." Charging anything for information -as all innovators do who report charging a fee in table 10 -inevitably creates a deadweight loss. After all, the marginal cost of production of copies of innovation-related information today is essentially zero for most innovations.
Of course, our argument is not that intellectual property based systems should be eliminated -there are probably cases where each system is preferable to the other. 
Example of new policy options
If free transfers of innovation-related information are indeed social welfare increasing relative to monopoly control over such information at least some of the time, an important question for policymakers then immediately emerges: Are government policies currently at least even-handed with respect to these two mechanisms? Or are government policies and programs in net encouraging innovators to charge fees or to restrict innovation transfers rather than engaging in more open behavior? We suspect the latter is the case.
Government certainly is making it more feasible for innovators to either maintain exclusivity in the use of their innovation or to sell it for a fee. As was discussed earlier, that is the whole purpose of the quite elaborate intellectual property rights systems established and funded with taxpayer dollars by governments world-wide. Government agencies also encourage use of this option in many subtle and not-so-subtle ways -driven by the explicit or implicit assumption that protection promotes innovation. For example, departments of the US government allow -one might even say encourage -firms and individuals to retain title to inventions developed with government funds, in order to 'promote commercialization of federally funded inventions'. Thus, recipients of NIH grants (grantees) are instructed as follows:
"As long as grantees abide by the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act, as amended by the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-404), and 37 CFR Part 401, they have the right to retain title to any invention conceived or first actually reduced to practice using NIH grant funds. The principal objectives of these laws and the implementing regulation are to promote commercialization of federally funded inventions, while ensuring that inventions are used in a manner that promotes free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery." (NIH 2003) This bias is pervasive. For example, the U.S. government funds various types of business assistance programs that invariably teach that acquiring intellectual property rights is the sensible, business-like thing to do. Consider advice given by SCORE, a nonprofit business advisory organization funded by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).
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5 Tips on Patents 1. If your company has an invention that you think is patentable, take steps at once. You may lose your right to patent it if you offer it for sale or disclose it publicly without patent protection. (SCORE 2008) The roots of this apparent bias in favor of intellectual property rights vs. free revealing is certainly understandable -the path towards private innovation rewards involving free revealing was not appreciated by many until quite recently. But once the free-revealing option is understood, policymakers can take steps to offset any existing biases. Three examples: code, to the tasks of existing intellectual property offices. They can also encourage "defensive publishing" as a mechanism to insure that user-innovators not seeking formal IP protection for themselves cannot be excluded from using their own inventions by others at a later point. (Henkel and Pangerl 2008) • Collaborative innovation among multiple problem-solvers increases the private returns to free revealing (Baldwin and Clark 2006) . Government can establish policies that help enable and support the "the roads of the Internet Age" in the form of low-cost high bandwidth universal connectivity, open standards for joint problem-solving and so on.
• Policymakers could contemplate encouraging free revealing of innovations by user-innovators. It could, for example, institute a system of tax credits analogous to R&D tax credits for innovators that freely reveal well-documented results of their private innovation developments. Documentation might take a form analogous to a patent disclosure, vetted for novelty by patent office examiners.
Suggestions for further research
With respect to indicator development, the Statistics Canada AT07 follow-up The significant evidence now available on these topics can be a useful input to discussions leading to the next revision of the Oslo Manual regarding development, and non-market peer-to-peer diffusion, of innovations by end users. This work also coincides with the development of the OECD Innovation Strategy (Gault and Huttner 2008) and is intended to contribute to the debate leading to the final report in 2010.
In order to maximize the value of these new indicators for policy purposes, they should be incorporated into technology use surveys that recur regularly and their use should be standardized in order to support international comparisons, at least across OECD countries. The repetition of the measurement and the international comparisons would support the monitoring and evaluation of policy interventions.
